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Abstract
We re-examine the relation between taxes and corporate leverage, using variation in
state corporate income tax rates. In contrast with prior research, we document that cor-
porate leverage increases following tax cuts for both privately held and publicly listed
firms. We use an estimated dynamic equilibrium model to show that tax cuts result
in lower default spreads and more distant default thresholds. These effects outweigh
the loss of benefits from the interest tax deduction and lead to higher leverage, espe-
cially for privately held firms. Overall, debt tax shields appear to be a secondary capital
structure consideration.
∗The views stated herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the Federal Re-
serve Board or the Federal Reserve System. We thank Celso Brunetti, Arthur Korteweg (discussant), John
Krainer, Mathias Kruttli, Marco Macchiavelli, Robert McDonald (discussant), Adrien Matray (discussant),
Carlos (Coco) Ramı́rez, Ben Ranish, David Thesmar (discussant) and seminar participants at the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Richmond, University College London, Higher School of Economics, University of Colorado,
Wharton School of Business, University of Leeds, HSBC Peking Business School, 2020 Red Rock Finance
Conference, the 2021 AFA Conference, the 2021 ASU Sonoran Winter Finance Conference, and the 2021 MFA
Conference for helpful comments. We thank Sam Dreith and Sara Shemali for excellent research assistance.
We are grateful to Marc Lovell from the Federal Reserve Board’s Legal Library for preparing a database of
legislature/legal library contacts and helping us identify enactments of state tax changes.
†Federal Reserve Board, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20551; 202-452-2987;
ivan.t.ivanov@frb.gov.
‡United States Senate, 534 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510;
Luke pettit@banking.senate.gov.
§University of Michigan and NBER, Ann Arbor, MI 48109; 734-764-1269; twhited@umich.edu.
1
1. Introduction
We revisit an old question that has been at the center of corporate finance at least since
Modigliani and Miller (1963): the effect of corporate taxes on business borrowing. And
we tackle this question in two new ways. First, we have new data on private firms and
can thus confront the issue that nearly all empirical evidence on this topic is based on
samples of large public companies (Titman and Wessels 1988; Graham 1996; Heider and
Ljungqvist 2015; Faccio and Xu 2015). Yet, most economic activity occurs in smaller, bank-
dependent, privately held companies that are significantly less well-capitalized than public
firms (Brown et al. 2020). For example, over half of new job creation in the United States
occurs in privately held companies (Smith 2007).
Using both our new data on private firms and standard data on public firms, we study
changes in state corporate income taxes since the 1980s. Interestingly, and in contrast to
the positive associations between corporate taxes and leverage found in several previous
studies, most of our results point to a negative relation between taxes and leverage, de-
spite the deductibility of interest in the tax code during our sample period. Moreover, we
uncover interesting anticipation effects, as companies adjust capital structure shortly after
the enactment of these laws, which typically become effective one to two years later.
Second, we use the estimation of a dynamic model of firm leverage to rationalize this
result. The model is tailored to understand private firms along one important dimension. In
contrast to large public firms, informational frictions prevent private firms from borrowing
against their future market value. Thus, while the tax deductibility of interest creates a
standard advantage for debt, higher taxes also make leverage more costly by lowering
profits and potential recovery in default. Because default thresholds then fall and credit
spreads rise, firms have an incentive to decrease leverage. We show quantitatively that the
effect of the interest tax shield is small, so the net effect on leverage is negative, especially
when firms are small.
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Turning to the details of our analysis, most of our data are from two supervisory data
sets that cover private U.S. firms. Our primary data set comes from the Federal Reserve’s Y-
14 Collection, which covers privately held, bank-dependent firms in the United States since
2011. These data provide one of the most detailed accounts of private firms’ balance sheets
that is currently available to researchers. In robustness tests, we also rely on the Shared
National Credit (SNC) database. This source spans a longer time period (1992–2013), and
it covers the borrowing of private and public firms reliant on the syndicated loan market,
which accounts for the vast majority of corporate borrowing. We also consider a sample of
standard Compustat data on nonfinancial firms that spans the post-2011 period.
Using the event study techniques in Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), we first investigate
how state corporate income tax cuts affect privately held firms, relying on the Y-14 data
for small and mid-sized private borrowers from 2011 through 2017. We examine cuts be-
cause this time period contains only four corporate income tax hikes, as compared to 62
tax cuts. We find that firms’ outstanding debt increases by approximately 3.6% in the one
to two years preceding the effective year of the tax cut and remains significantly elevated
at between 2.1% and 3.5% up to three years after the effective year.
While at first glance, the response of firms before the effective year of tax changes may
indicate pre-trends, we show that these responses are more indicative of anticipation. Con-
ducting the same event study using the enactment date instead of the effective date of tax
cuts indicates that firms first respond to the tax cuts in the enactment year with no signifi-
cant reaction before enactment. In addition, the event study coefficients around enactment
dates are larger and more precisely estimated, ranging from approximately 4% in the en-
actment year to about 3% three years later. This result suggests that firms are more likely
to respond to the tax enactment packages rather than to the usual multiple effective years
associated with each tax package.
We also show that the large increase in leverage ratios of small private firms is primarily
driven by changes in long-term debt. In contrast, we find that large private firms do not
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change debt in response to corporate income tax cuts and only exhibit limited and short-
lived increases in non-debt liabilities such as trade credit. Similarly, while we also find that
leverage rises in response to tax cuts for our sample of public firms, the magnitudes are
smaller, and the significance is marginal.
To provide economic intuition for these somewhat unusual results, we use our data
to estimate a dynamic model of leverage and investment in the spirit of Hennessy and
Whited (2005, 2007). In the model, firms face an exogenous stochastic tax rate, so they
optimize their policies considering the possible future evolution of corporate taxes, as in
Hennessy and Strebulaev (2020). They also receive an interest tax deduction. Because their
debt need not be fully collateralized, they can default, which occurs when they have insuf-
ficient internal resources to repay their debt. A higher tax rate exerts downward pressure
on optimal debt because credit spreads rise, as both default thresholds and lender recovery
fall in default. Ex ante, it is not clear which of these effects is quantitatively more impor-
tant, but our estimation results indicate that the negative effects of taxes on leverage are an
order of magnitude more important than the positive effects, but only in those states of the
world in which debt is risky. Otherwise, the tax advantage is more important, although the
effects are small, as in Li et al. (2016).
We also show that the relation between corporate tax rates and leverage is conditional
on firm size, with small firms exhibiting a negative relation between taxes and leverage,
and large firms exhibiting a positive relation. Intuitively, large firms are less productive, so
they do not need to use debt to fund capital expenditures. Therefore, they keep their lever-
age in a region in which it is effectively fully collateralized, so the interest tax deduction is
all that matters. In contrast, small firms are more productive and need to use debt to fund
projects. They optimally operate with debt that is not fully collateralized, so the effect of
taxes on default matters more.
This last feature of the model helps rationalize our empirical result of a negative relation
between taxes and corporate borrowing with the positive relation documented in much of
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the prior literature (Givoly et al. 1992; Graham 1996; Titman and Wessels 1988; Gordon and
Lee 2001; Faccio and Xu 2015; Fleckenstein et al. 2019). This work focuses on samples of
large, publicly traded companies, which are much safer than our sample of private firms,
so interest tax shields represent a first-order capital structure consideration. In comparison,
the vast majority of firms in our samples are privately held, for which the costs of debt are
likely to be the main driving force of financing policy. A final contribution of our work
to this literature is our collection of tax enactment dates, which allows us to examine the
dynamics of firms’ responses to corporate income tax changes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data, Section 3
describes our empirical methodology, and Section 4 presents our results. In Section 5, we
outline, estimate, and analyze our dynamic model. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
2.1 Data on Corporate Borrowing
Our data on firm-level income statement and balance sheet information comes from
Schedule H.1 of the Federal Reserve’s Y-14Q data collection. The collection began in June
of 2012 to support the Federal Reserve’s stress tests and contains granular information on
the loan portfolio of the 33 largest banks in the United States.1 Specifically, banks provide
loan-level data on their corporate loan portfolio whenever a loan exceeds $1 million in
commitment amount, together with the most recent financial statement information of the
associated borrower, if available. These data are quarterly, and the sample period runs from
the third quarter of 2011 to present. Borrower financials are typically annual and provided
to satisfy loan collateral and covenant requirements.2 Because only a minor fraction of firms
1The panel has grown over time and included 37 institutions until 2018Q1. Regulatory changes increased the
reporting threshold from $50 to $100 billion as of 2018Q2, thereby leading to the exclusion of four institutions
with total assets below $100 billion. Loans in the Y-14 Collection account for approximately three-quarters
of total U.S. commercial and industrial lending.
2The smallest companies in the Y-14 collection do not have financial statement data, likely because it is too
costly, so they substitute tax returns, which we do not observe.
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report financials quarterly, we keep the financial statement information with a reporting
date closest to the end of each calendar year, which is typically the information from Q4
for the trailing twelve months.
Finally, we restrict the sample to domestic private borrowers, excluding foreign and
U.S. state and local government entities, individuals and private households, utilities (two-
digit NAICS code of “22” or two-digit SIC code of “49”), financials (two-digit NAICS code
of “52” or one-digit SIC code of “6”), public administration entities (two-digit NAICS code
of “92” or one-digit SIC code of “9”), educational institutions (three-digit NAICS code
of “611”), hospitals (three-digit NAICS code of “622”), religious institutions (three-digit
NAICS code of “813”), and other nonprofit organizations. We also exclude firms that si-
multaneously are located in multiple states through subsidiaries. Finally, we exclude pub-
lic firms, as well as firms with publicly traded securities as we study those separately with
the CRSP-Compustat data. See Appendix A in Brown et al. (2020) for a more detailed de-
scription of the data set.
Although we do not observe firm tax filing status, the small size of the companies in
the Y-14 data suggests that a significant portion of firms are subject to individual taxation
of pass-through income. For example, half of the firm-years with financial statements in
Y-14 have less than $18 million in total assets, and three quarters of the firms have less
than $70 million in total assets. Considering our focus on corporate income taxes, we re-
move pass-through entities such as sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S-corporations
using the following restrictions. We exclude borrowing entities where the entity is classi-
fied as “Individual” or the guarantor of the debt is classified as “Individual”. We further
exclude firm-year observations in which book assets fall below $100 million in the previous
year. We impose this restriction because larger companies are significantly more likely to
benefit from choosing corporate taxation and organize as C-corporations.3 Imposing this
3The major tax benefits of organizing as a C-corporation relative to a pass-through entity include no restric-
tion on the number of shareholders or types of ownership, retaining earnings for future expansion at a lower
tax cost, and a wider range of deductions. Despite the lower tax burden on pass-through entities relative to
C-corporations, Smith et al. (2019) show that these incentives disappear for large firms with more $100 mil-
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restriction is likely conservative, as the Joint Committee on Taxation reports that virtually
all assets of C-corporations belong to those companies whose total assets exceed $100 mil-
lion.4
For the purposes of our empirical tests, we require the availability of the book value to-
tal assets, net income, net sales, operating income, total liabilities, long-term debt, and total
debt. We also require that the beginning-of-period book value of total assets be available,
as we use this variable to scale all financial variables. The resulting sample has 38,221 non-
singleton firm-year observations during the 2011-2017 time period. We winsorize credit
commitments and all financial statement variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to miti-
gate the effect of extreme observations. Variable definitions are in Appendix A.
We also study the effect of corporate taxes on borrowing using the Shared National
Credit (SNC) data, which spans 1992 through the present. The SNC Program covers all
syndicated deals that exceed $20 million and that are held by three or more unaffiliated
institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration, or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).5 The loan deals in this data
collection comprise nearly the entire syndicated loan market in the United States in terms
of loan amounts. Because we study the effect of taxes on firm borrowing, we aggregate
loan commitment amounts to the borrower-level. Total firm commitments therefore rep-
resent the combined amount of credit line sizes and term loan commitments. We restrict
this sample to domestic firms and exclude government entities, utilities (two-digit NAICS
code of “22”), financials (two-digit NAICS code of “52”), public administration entities
(two-digit NAICS code of “92”), and firms that have defaulted on their debt and are either
in non-accrual status or have “troubled-debt” restructurings.
Our sample of public firms comes from the CRSP-Compustat Fundamentals Annual
lion in sales.
4See, Table 3 in https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4765.
5The SNC inclusion criteria also covered deals with two supervised unaffiliated lenders prior to 1999. Exclud-
ing these deals does not significantly affect our results. For more detail on the SNC rule change see Ivanov
et al. (2019).
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database. We limit the sample period to 2011 through 2017 to ensure comparability with
the sample of private firms. Because a firm’s headquarters location in Compustat is back-
filled to its most recent headquarters location, we use a file provided by Standard & Poor’s
that contains the correct historical headquarters locations since 1994 (“CST HIST”). As with
our samples of private firms, we exclude utilities (2-digit SIC code of “49”), financials (1-
digit SIC code of “6”), public administration entities (1-digit SIC code of “9”), foreign firms
(where the firm’s historical headquarters or incorporation location is outside of the United
States), firms with missing headquarters location, firms with negative or missing total as-
sets, and firms with missing pre-tax earnings.
Finally, to understand whether private firms adjust leverage through equity issuance
we download Regulation D (private placements) data from the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) website. Specifically, we scrape the names and IRS tax identi-
fiers (whenever available) of all firms with private placements on the SEC website since
2009, using the SEC-provided firm CIKs and index files.6 We then merge these observa-
tions with the Y-14 sample of 38,221 firm-years to ascertain whether any sample firms have
ever issued private placements. We find 754 firm-year matches, so it appears that few of
our sample firm tap private equity markets.7
2.2 State Taxation and Economic Data
We use the data sets provided on Owen Zidar’s website8 on the top statutory state
corporate income tax rates since 1987 to identify the effective dates of changes in state
corporate taxes. For each of these tax changes we then collect the corresponding enactment
date, or the date the tax change becomes law. We gather all enactment dates since 2012
from the legislature website of each state or the Tax Foundation website. We collect data on
6See https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/full-index/.




all enactment dates prior to 2012 from amendments to the states’ tax statutes.9 Specifically,
we obtain electronic copies/scans of the tax statutes from each state’s legislature/legal
library. We read through the statutes to identify the relevant corporate income tax rate
changes and record the respective enactment dates, typically the date the state’s governor
signs the legislation. We identify the tax enactments corresponding to 99 state corporate
income tax changes in this manner.10 For 6 of the tax changes, the state librarians directed
us to online legislative archives, and we found and downloaded the relevant bills or statute
texts ourselves. In 2 cases where the enactment or effective dates were unclear from the tax
statute text, we found information from state legislature websites.
Next, we obtain annual data on state and county GDP and the unemployment rate, as
well as county population, GDP, employment, and per-capita income from the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis.11
Finally, in all of our regressions, following Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2018), we con-
trol for the structure of the corporate tax base using the fifteen measures listed below: an
indicator of having throwback rules, an indicator of having combined reporting rules, in-
vestment tax credit rates, research and development (R&D) tax credit rates, an indicator
for whether the R&D tax credit applies to an incremental base that is a moving average of
past expenditures, an indicator for whether the R&D tax credit applies to an incremental
base that is fixed on a level of past expenditures, the number of years for loss carrybacks,
number of years for loss carryforwards, an indicator for franchise taxes, an indicator for
federal income tax deductibility, an indicator for the federal income tax base as the state
tax base, an indicator for federal accelerated depreciation, an indicator for accelerated cost
recovery system (MACRS) depreciation, an indicator for federal bonus depreciation, and
corporate tax apportionment weights. We extend the fifteen tax base measures through
9We are grateful to Marc Lovell from the Legal Library at the Federal Reserve Board for preparing a database
of legislature/legal library contact information for each state in our sample.
10In 11 cases where state librarians could not immediately locate the relevant tax legislation, we consulted a
legal librarian from the Federal Reserve Board for legislative histories from LexisNexis to provide the state
librarian with the statute or bill number.
11See https://apps.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm.
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2017 by collecting information from the CCH tax handbooks and the websites of state gov-
ernments. Additionally, we collect state corporate income tax rates since 2010 from the Tax
Foundation website and obtain top statutory state individual income tax rates from Tax
Foundation website since 2000.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
We describe the sample of private firm-years for which we have available financial
statement information from 2011 through 2017 in Panel A of of Table 1. The typical com-
pany has $258 million in book assets, while a quarter of companies has between $100 and
$150 million in book assets. In addition, sample firms are significantly more levered than
the typical public firm with total debt-to-assets of approximately 36% and total liabilities-
to-assets of 69%. Sample firms are also significantly more profitable and hold substantially
less cash than their public counterparts (see, e.g. Kahle and Stulz 2017).
As we study the response of corporate leverage to corporate income tax changes, we
need to ensure our leverage measures vary sufficiently in order to detect the effects of tax
changes. Because borrowers in our sample have access to bank financing (by construction),
a significant fraction of which is in the form of credit lines, and that bank loan renegotiation
is frequent (Roberts and Sufi 2009; Roberts 2015), leverage is also likely to exhibit frequent
and significant variations. To this end, in Figure 1 we plot annual changes in our three
leverage measures: long-term debt, total debt, and total liabilities. All three panels show
significant variation in leverage among the private firms in our sample.
Panel B of Table 1 describes the sample of firm-years reliant on syndicated loan financ-
ing from 1992 through 2013. As in the case of Panel A, we do not include post-2013 data
as we are interested in examining the dynamics in corporate borrowing for up to 5 years
prior to a tax event. Most of the firms in the sample are private companies that are unlikely
to have access to public debt and equity markets and consequently obtain most of their ex-
ternal financing through bank borrowing. The typical (median) firm reliant on syndicated
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financing has approximately $143 million dollars in loan commitments, while a quarter of
the sample has less than $65 million in commitments. Additionally, the median utilized
amount, which is defined as the sum of credit line drawdowns and term loans, is approx-
imately $50 million, while the average utilization ratio under all credit commitments is
about 50%. This suggests that sample firms have significant amount of slack in their credit
lines.
Panel C summarizes the state corporate income tax hikes and tax cuts that become ef-
fective between 1987 and 2019. State legislatures often introduce new tax packages in a
staggered fashion. For example, the state of Indiana approved a tax package in 2011 that
lowered corporate income taxes from 8.5% to 6.25% between 2013 and 2017 (a 0.5% reduc-
tion in years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and a 0.25% reduction in 2017).12 In this example, the
Indiana tax package enters our estimation sample only once with 2013 as the tax cut ef-
fective year. We have a total of 36 tax hikes and 121 tax cuts. Tax hikes increase corporate
income taxes by an average of 1.31%, while tax cuts reduce taxes by about 0.59%. Prior to
the effective date of tax changes, state corporate income tax rates are lower in states with
subsequent tax hikes than in states with tax cuts. For example, initial corporate income tax
rates average 6.59% in tax hike states and 7.59% in tax cut states. The tax changes reverse
this pattern, resulting in higher state corporate income taxes in states with tax hikes.
3. Empirical Approach
We use an event study methodology around corporate tax increases and corporate tax
cuts:
yit = ᾱi + ¯βmt +
k≥+5∑
k=−5




where i, m, t, and k denote firms, industries, years, and years relative to the event of in-
terest, respectively. Specifically, k < 0 corresponds to dates preceding the event, and k ≥ 0
corresponds to dynamic effects relative to the event. Additionally, t ≥ +5 represents five
or more years after the event. yit represents the outcome of interest, such as the natural log
of the firm’s total loan commitments, ᾱi and ¯βmt are firm and industry-year fixed effects.
Given the inclusion of firm fixed effects, ᾱi, the event study estimates represent deviations
from the average level of the outcome of interest for a given firm. As noted in Borusyak
and Jaravel (2017), this specification is valid under the assumption that treatment effects,
represented by the λ̄k’s, are homogeneous across units and calendar time, depending only
on k.
As noted in Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), the model in equation (1) is unidentified up to
a linear trend. One solution is to specify a base year before which no pre-trends are present.
In specifications relying on the small firm balance sheet data or public firm balance sheet
data since 2011, we define this omitted category as years t ≤ −3 relative to the event. We do
not choose the omitted categories to be in the two years prior to the tax changes becoming
effective because these changes are typically enacted one to two years prior to becoming
effective. For example, out of the 88 enactments of tax legislation packages between 1987
and 2019, 38 become effective immediately or retroactively, 38 become effective in the next
year and 12 become effective in more than one year. However, although a number of the tax
legislation packages are effective immediately, they gradually increase/decrease rates for
up to 4–5 years in the future. In these cases, our event studies based on tax effective dates
estimate firm leverage responses relative to the first instance of a tax change becoming
effective. The event studies based on tax enactments simply estimate leverage responses
around the enactment dates of tax legislation packages.
In our robustness specifications relying on the SNC data, we choose the two omitted
categories to be apart at years t = −3 and t ≤ −6 relative to the tax change so that we
are better able to detect non-linear pre-trends. In other words, the event study estimates
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in the two years leading up to tax change implementation represent tests of whether firms
respond to tax changes immediately upon the announcement of changes in tax policy.
Despite the lower efficiency of the estimator in equation 1 (see Borusyak and Jaravel
2017), equation 1 is still preferable to a canonical difference-in-differences specification,
such as:
yit = ᾱi + β̄t + λDit + δX + εit (2)
Specifically, equation 2 is only valid under the restrictive assumption that the λ̄k’s in equa-
tion 1 are all equal for k > 0. This requirement means that the treatment leads to an im-
mediate and permanent jump in the outcome variable and no further effects. If this as-
sumption is violated, the estimate of λ in equation (2) is bias difficult to interpret because
λ is the weighted average of λ̄k’s in equation 1, and not all the weights need to be positive
(Borusyak and Jaravel 2017; de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille 2020; Abraham and Sun
2020; Goodman-Bacon 2021). This work has pointed out that bias in λ stems from using
post-treatment periods to provide counterfactuals for earlier periods. Additionally, equa-
tion (2) assumes the absence of pre-trends prior to the implementation of tax changes. This
assumption may also be violated in our setting because state corporate income tax changes
are typically announced one to two years prior to implementation.
Finally, in equation (1), X is a vector of controls. For all three data sets, we include 4-
digit NAICS industry-year and firm fixed effects. We also include the contemporaneous
tax base controls described in Section 2.
The remaining controls differ for each of our three datasets because of data limitations.
For the regressions using the Y-14 data, we include firm internal credit rating fixed effects,
which range from AAA to D, and the log of lagged firm sales. We also include county-
level log employment, per-capita income, log population, and lagged levels and changes
in log GDP. For the regressions using the SNC data, we include the state unemployment
rate and lagged levels and changes in state log GDP. Borrower controls include lagged
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levels of average remaining maturities across all loans, utilization rates across all loans, the
number of lending relationships, pass rating. Because the SNC data set does not contain
any information from borrower financial statements, we can only include these lending-
related controls. For our regressions using Compustat data, our firm controls are lagged
levels and changes in log total assets, the ratio of net income to assets, the ratio of property,
plant, and equipment to total assets, and the market-to-book ratio. We also include the state
unemployment rate and lagged levels and changes in state log GDP.
4. Results
4.1 Private Firm Evidence
We first test how corporate leverage is related to state corporate income tax cuts, uti-
lizing the sample of private firms spanning 2011–2017 and data on state corporate income
tax cuts from 2007 through 2019. We do not conduct a similar analysis around corporate
income tax hikes because there are only seven corporate income tax hikes during this time
period, while there are 62 tax cuts. Additionally, three out of the seven tax hikes occur prior
to the start of our sample period: Maryland in 2007, Michigan in 2007, and Oregon in 2010.
Moreover, these tax changes affect only a small minority of firms in our sample. Given these
limitations, we are unable to conduct reliable estimation of corporate leverage responses
around state corporate income tax hikes. Nevertheless, we control for the incidence of tax
hikes throughout our specifications.
One potential concern with our tests is that contemporaneous changes in state individ-
ual income taxes may drive corporate leverage rather than corporate income tax changes.
For example, the documented leverage effects could be attributed to changes in consumer
spending triggered by changes in personal taxation. Prior literature has demonstrated
that reductions in state personal income taxes increase personal wages and employment,
thereby leading to higher personal disposable income (Zidar 2019). Therefore, individual
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income tax cuts are likely to lead to higher consumer spending and consequently to higher
firm investment opportunities and borrowing. Conversely, individual income tax hikes
lead to reductions in firm investment opportunities and lower leverage ratios. To account
for these possibilities, we also include event study indicators associated with state individ-
ual income tax cuts and tax hikes throughout our specifications. Specifically, we include
the same set of event indicators, from t = −2 through t ≥ 4+, as in the case of corporate
income tax changes.13
The consensus view in the prior literature is that the main mechanism through which
taxes affect borrowing is debt interest tax shields. Specifically, higher taxes increase the
value of debt interest tax shields, thereby leading to greater incentives to borrow. However,
higher taxes also decrease firms’ after-tax cash flow, thereby making firms more likely to
default on risky debt and reducing lender recovery rates given default. This is especially
the case for small private companies that do not have access to external capital markets
other than bank credit that is typically contingent on maintaining high cash flow (Sufi
2009). In other words, in addition to reducing the value of debt interest tax shields, tax cuts
are also likely to increase firms’ distance to default thresholds and increase their borrowing
capacity. Conversely, corporate tax increases enhance the value of debt interest tax shields
but also decrease firms’ distance to default thresholds. Therefore, the relation between taxes
and corporate borrowing is an empirical question.
Table 2 presents the effects of tax cuts on balance sheet outcomes in event time. We
define the base category in the event studies as years t ≤ −3 relative to the tax cut effective
year. We focus on three main outcomes: total debt, long-term debt, and total liabilities.
Because smaller private companies may be more financially constrained and thus exhibit
differential responses to corporate tax changes, we also split the sample at the median value
of lagged total assets ($258 million). “Small” firms are defined as those with below median
13Our results for long-term debt, total debt, and total liabilities are nearly identical if we do not include the
event indicators for individual income tax changes.
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total assets, with “large” firms constituting the rest of the sample.14
We find that total debt, long-term debt, and total liabilities all increase for small private
firms around corporate income tax cuts. The change first occurs one to two years prior to
the tax cuts becoming effective, although the effects only become statistically significant
one year before the effective date. These leverage increases persist for up to two years after
the effective date, especially for the sample of small firms, where leverage is persistently
higher through event year t+2 for all measures of leverage. The dynamics of long-term and
total debt appear nearly identical, suggesting that long-term borrowing drives total debt
dynamics. Increases in total liabilities for small private firms exceed the increases in long-
term and total debt, but the majority of the response in total liabilities is explained by the
increases in debt. Thus, we find scant evidence for an important role for changes in trade
credit around corporate income tax changes. Finally, large private firms do not appear to
respond to tax cuts, with these effects being overall smaller and statistically insignificant.
While it is possible that firms also respond to corporate income tax cuts by adjusting eq-
uity issuance, this scenario is unlikely for the bank-dependent private firms in our sample.
Specifically, as Appendix Table B2 indicates, only 754 out of the 38,221 firm-years in our
sample raise money through private equity markets between 2009 and 2019. Replicating
our results by excluding these firm-years results in event study estimates that are nearly
identical (see Appendix Table B3).
Because distressed companies might not have taxable profits, we exclude companies
with bank internal ratings of “CCC” and lower. As shown in Appendix Table B1, the results
from including these companies are weaker both economically and statistically, consistent
with the notion that firms without taxable profits do not react to tax changes.
Our next set of tests examines whether firms’ responses up to two years prior to the
effective date is driven by pre-trends, or whether these results reflect firm responses to the
actual tax cut enactments. In Table 3, we present the results of reestimating our event stud-
14Our results are very similar when we choose alternative cutoffs such as $300 million in prior year total
assets or the 75th percentile of prior year total assets.
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ies around the enactment dates. We find that firm leverage increases in the enactment year,
as well as in some of the subsequent years, indicating that the firm leverage changes prior
to effective dates is driven by firms reacting promptly to the enactment of the tax legis-
lation. We do not detect any significant pre-trends for either small or large private firms.
Similar to the results in Table 2, large private firms do not exhibit a significant response to
tax cuts, with the exception of a statistically noisy increase in total liabilities. In contrast,
leverage ratios of small firms in terms of long-term and total debt as well as total liabili-
ties continue to exhibit significant responses to tax cuts for up to three years following tax
enactment.
The dynamics evident in our results speak to two important alternative interpretations
of our results. First, one could imagine that the effects we see prior to enactment are simply
the reactions of firms who want to take advantage of the interest deduction before the
tax cut. However, this hypothesis is inconsistent with the persistent effects we see after
the both the enactment and effective dates. Second, it is possible that our results are a
product of credit supply effects, with banks shifting lending to low-tax states. However,
this hypothesis is inconsistent with the effects we see before the effective dates, as banks
would have no incentive to shift lending to states before the new tax code becomes relevant.
Overall, we document that taxes are negatively related to corporate borrowing. These
results stand in stark contrast with the empirical relations documented in the prior liter-
ature. For example, Titman and Wessels (1988), Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), and Faccio
and Xu (2015), all document that taxes are positively related to corporate leverage. A no-
table difference between these studies and ours is that we rely on samples of smaller pri-
vately held firms that are more likely to closer to financial distress than public firms.15 In
support of the notion that size and public status matter for the leverage-tax relation, our
result of a negative relation between taxes and leverage is not without precedent, as Farre-
15For example, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show firm size is one of the most informative predictors of financial
constraints. This notion is corroborated by Erel et al. (2015), who show that small, privately firms in their
sample appear to face financial constraints, while large private firms do not.
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Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015) also find a negative association between changes in book
leverage and taxes in a sample of small private firms.
Finally, to understand whether the difference between our results and prior work is
attributable to differences between public and private firms, we next examine how tax
cuts affect the leverage ratios of larger, public firms. For this analysis, we use data from
Compustat. Table 4 shows the evolution of three measures of corporate leverage around
state corporate income tax cuts: the book values of total debt-to-total assets and long-term
debt-to-total assets, as well as the market value of long-term debt-to-total assets. Columns
(1)–(3) of Table 4 present event study results around the effective dates of tax cuts, while
columns (4)–(6) show event study results around tax cut enactments. Columns (1)–(3) show
that the leverage responses of Compustat firms are broadly similar to those documented in
Section 4.1. Leverage increases significantly two years prior to tax cuts becoming effective,
and these effects persist up to a year after the tax cuts become effective, fading to zero
thereafter. However, the effects are smaller in magnitude, and the statistical significance is
marginal.
4.2 Real Effects of Tax Cuts
While our results so far establish a robust negative relation between tax changes and
firms’ equilibrium credit outcomes, it is also important to understand whether the changes
in borrowing affect firms’ real outcomes such as investment and profitability. Tax cuts may
ultimately lead to higher investment and profitability via two channels: a direct positive
effect on the marginal product of capital and a fall in the cost of capital resulting from
changes in default thresholds as argued in Section 1. Because of the existence of time-to-
build lags, and because investment is lumpy (Doms and Dunne 1998; Whited 2006), the
effect on both assets and profitability may not be immediate and may materialize with
significant delay following the implementation of tax cuts.
Our data also provide information on net capital expenditures, or the difference be-
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tween capital spending and proceeds from divestitures/assets sales, of each company.
Consistent with this idea, in Table 5 we show that net capital expenditures of small private
firms increase by approximately 1.4% at tax enactment dates, contemporaneously with the
leverage increases we observe in Table 3 (column 5). In contrast, the effects for large private
companies are small and statistically insignificant (column 6). As a result, net investment
also increases in the full sample by about 1.1% (column 4). This result is particularly inter-
esting, as it suggests a separate channel for our results. Firms invest following tax cuts, and
they borrow immediately to fund these outlays. Overall, our results suggest that tax cuts
have a significant impact on firms’ investment opportunities, as we document meaningful
changes in firm investment and profitability.
We also test whether the higher investment documented in columns (1)-(3) is accompa-
nied by increases in firm profitability. The results in columns (4)–(6) of Table 5 show that
EBITDA does not change following tax enactments for either small or large firms, suggest-
ing that tax cuts do not affect profitability or that positive changes in profitability may still
materialize with a significant delay that is outside of our event time horizon.
4.3 Longer-Time Series Evidence from Corporate Borrowing Data
Next, we test how corporate credit is related to state corporate income tax changes,
utilizing the sample of firms reliant on the syndicated loan market. We measure total firm
commitments using the total syndicated commitments in a given firm-year. Total firm com-
mitments are the combined amount of credit line sizes and term loan amounts. One ad-
vantage of using total commitments as opposed to the drawn (funded) portion of commit-
ments is that we are able to better measure firms’ demand for credit. Finally, as described in
Section 3, our specifications include firm fixed effects, so the event-study estimates should
be interpreted as annual deviations from the average level of total credit commitments for
a given firm.
Figure 2 presents how firm commitments are related to state corporate income tax cuts
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and corporate income tax hikes in event time. Specifically, the figure plots event study
estimates from a Log(Commitments) regression on event time indicators. In addition, in
some specifications we include time-varying borrower controls, as well as state economy
and tax base controls. Panel A shows that state tax hikes have a large negative effect on the
total commitments of the average firm. These negative effects first appear two years prior to
tax hikes becoming effective, indicating that the average firm reduces credit commitments
by about 5% immediately upon the announcement of state corporate income tax hikes. The
decline in corporate borrowing intensifies to up to 7% after tax-hike implementation and
persists until for three more years. Given total commitments are typically twice as large as
funded debt, these effects correspond to a between 2.5 and 3.5 percentage points increase
in leverage. Importantly, these effects are not permanent and fade to zero thereafter.
Panel A of Figure 2 also indicates that total firm commitments increase around corpo-
rate tax cuts but that the magnitude of such increases is substantially smaller than in the
case of tax hikes. Specifically, the average firm increases borrowing by about 2% as tax cuts
become effective. However, these results are not statistically significant. The significantly
larger tax hike effects are likely to be a byproduct of the magnitudes of tax hikes exceed
the magnitudes of tax cuts, as shown in Panel C of Table 1. Panel B of Figure 2 augments
the analysis in Panel A by including time-varying firm, state economy, and state tax base
controls, painting a very similar picture to the results in Panel A.
In Panels C and D Figure 2, we replicate the first two panels for the subsample of firms
that are unlikely to be financially-distressed: those that are assigned a Shared National
Credit (SNC) rating of “Pass” as of the previous year. Financially distressed firms are much
less likely to have taxable income and therefore less likely to respond to taxes in any way. In
line with this intuition, we find that “Pass”-rated firms exhibit a larger increase in borrow-
ing of approximately 4–5% following tax cuts and that this effect is statistically significant
in some specifications. Additionally, the effect of tax hikes on corporate borrowing is over-
all very similar for the subsample of high-credit quality firm.
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5. Model
To offer a cohesive framework to understand the underlying economics behind the em-
pirical patterns in our data, we turn to a dynamic model of an equilibrium economy with a
representative consumer and a unit continuum of firms. The economy also contains a gov-
ernment and a financial intermediary, but these players simply act as pass-through agents
for the firms and consumer.
Each of the infinitely lived firms uses capital and labor in a stochastic, decreasing re-






where k is the stock of capital, n is labor, z is a productivity shock, α is capital’s share,
θ governs the degree of returns to scale, and where we normalize the parameter ν to be
1− (1− α)θ. In addition to this basic technology, we assume that the firm has a fixed com-
ponent of operating costs, which we denote as f . The productivity shock, z, is lognormally
distributed and follows a process given by:
ln(z′) = ρ ln(z) + σzε
′, ε′ ∼ N (0, 1), (4)
where a prime indicates the subsequent period, and no prime indicates the current period.
Investment in capital, I , is defined by a standard capital stock accounting identity:
k′ ≡ (1− δ)k + I, (5)
in which δ is the rate of capital depreciation. The price of the capital good has been normal-
ized to one. Adjusting the capital stock incurs quadratic costs that take the form:
ψ(k, k′) =
ψ(k′ − (1− δ)k)2
2k
(6)
where ψ is a parameter that governs the magnitude of adjustment costs.
Taxation in our model is simple, as there is only corporate taxation at a stochastic rate
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τ , which follows an autoregressive process given by
τ ′ = ρττ + στu
′, u′ ∼ N (0, 1). (7)
This tax rate applies to profits and to financing activities, as described next.
The firm can finance its optimal investment program with internal equity in the form of
retained earnings or external debt. We let p denote the stock of net debt, so p > 0 indicates
that the firm has debt on the balance sheet, and p < 0 indicates that the firm has cash on the
balance sheet. We assume that debt is raised through a competitive financial intermediary
sector, which in turn raises the necessary funds from the representative consumer. Debt
takes the form of a one-period discount bond, on which the firm can default. Let the interest
rate on debt be r̃(k′, p′, z), so debt proceeds are p′/(1+r(k′, n′, b′, z, τ)(1−τ)).16 As we outline
below, this interest rate is determined endogenously from the lender’s zero-profit condition
and is therefore a function of the model’s state variables. If instead the firm opts to save, it
earns the after-tax risk-free rate, r, with the interest taxed at a rate τ . Thus, the interest rate
on debt can be expressed as:
r(k′, b′, z, τ) =
 r̃(k
′, b′, z, τ) if p > 0
r if p ≤ 0
(8)
Cash flows to shareholders, e(k, p, n, k′, p′, z, τ), are then the firm’s after-tax operating
income plus net debt issuance, minus net expenditure on investment, and minus tax-
deductible interest payments on debt, as follows:





)θ − wn− f) (9)
− (k′ − (1− δ)k)− ψ(k, k′) + p
′
1 + r(k′, n′, b′, z, τ)(1− τ)
− p,
where w is the wage rate, which is determined in equilibrium.
While a positive firm cash flow is distributed to its stockholders, we assume that nega-
16Note that this formulation assumes that the firm takes the tax advantage in the period in which it issues
the debt. While not in accord with real-world debt contracts, this assumption reduces the state space and
simplifies the default condition (Strebulaev and Whited 2012).
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tive cash flows are not allowed, that is:
e(k, p, n, k′, p′, z, τ) ≥ 0. (10)
This assumption is tantamount to eliminating external equity finance. Because much of
our sample constitutes private firms, who have no access to public equity markets, this
assumption is innocuous.17
The Bellman equation for the problem can then be expressed as:
π(k, p, z, τ) = max
k′,n,p′
{
e(k, p, n, k′, p′, z, τ) +
1
1 + r
Eπ (k′, p′, z′, τ ′)
}
, (11)
subject to (5) and (10).
5.1 Loan contract
We assume that a perfectly competitive financial intermediary sector offers the firm
a one-period loan contract, which need not be fully collateralized. As such, the firm can
default. In contrast to the models in Hennessy and Whited (2007) or Gao et al. (2020), we
do not assume that lenders can extend credit as long as the firm has positive present value.
Instead, we follow Gilchrist et al. (2013) and Michaels et al. (2019) by assuming that the firm
defaults if it does not have sufficient resources on hand to repay its debt, that is, its future
market value is not collateralizable. This assumption is particularly apt for our sample of
smaller private firms.
Specifically, default is triggered when debt repayment exceeds the firm’s current after-






)θ − wn− f)+ (1− ξ)(1− δ)k < p (12)
Note that we subtract the wage bill from output in (12) because labor is paid in full, even if
the firm subsequently defaults. Note also that taxes get paid before the lender can recover
17When we allow external equity to exist but be costly, if we calibrate the cost so that the frequency of equity
issuance is similar to that of public firms, we find qualitatively similar results.
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any payments. Both of these timing conventions are in accordance with absolute priority
rules. Finally, because the tax deduction is taken when the firm issues debt, it is absent
from this condition. For fixed levels of (k, n, p), (12) defines a region over the joint domain
of (z, τ) in which default occurs. We denote this region Ω.
Given this default threshold, the contractual interest rate, r̃(k′, b′, z, τ), is determined
by a zero-profit condition that must hold under free entry in the intermediation sector.
The payoff to the lender outside of default is simply this contractual interest rate. Inside
default, the lender recovers an amount equal to the left side of (12). Thus, under free entry
and risk-neutrality, the face value of debt discounted at the risky rate r̃(k′, p′, z, τ) must






z′k′αn′β + ξ (1− δ) k′
)




1 + r̃(k′, p′, z, τ)
.
(13)
For a given (p′, k′, z, τ), equations (12) and (13) pin down the loan contract.
5.2 Equilibrium
The economy also contains an infinitely lived representative consumer, who chooses
consumption and labor each period to maximize the expected present value of her utility,
with a discount factor b. Her one-period utility function is given by ln(c) + ϕ(1 − ns), in
which c is consumption, ns is the supply of labor, and ϕ is a parameter that governs the
utility of leisure. Her budget constraint is given by:
c+ p′d − pd(1 + r) = wns + e(·) + T, (14)
in which pd is consumer wealth, and T is the net tax revenue generated from the firms,
which we assume the government transfers to the consumer as a lump sum. Let ζ be the
stationary distribution over the firm’s states, (z, τ, k, p). We define equilibrium in this econ-
omy as follows.
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium consists of (i) optimal firm policies for capital, labor, and
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debt, {k′, n, p′}, (ii) allocations to the consumer of consumption, c, and labor, ns, and (iii) prices,
(w, r), such that:
1. All firms solve the problem given by (11).
2. The consumer maximizes her utility, subject to (14).









(y − I + T )dζ. (17)
5.3 Solution
We solve the model using policy-function iteration and bisection, which yields an equi-
librium wage rate, a value function, π(k, p, z, τ), and policy functions for capital and debt,
given by k′(k, p, z, τ) and p′(k, p, z, τ).
5.4 Estimation
We estimate the model parameters using our sample of highly rated small firms from
the Y14 data. To simplify computation, we set a subset of our parameters outside the model.
First, we set the consumer’s discount factor equal to 0.96. Second, following Bloom et al.
(2018), we set ϕ = 2. This parameterization leaves us with a consumer that spends one-
third of her hours working. Third, we set the standard deviation of the tax rate equal to the
standard deviation of the taxes observed in our sample (0.013), and we set average level of
the tax rate equal to 0.2, following Nikolov and Whited (2014). This rate is lower than the
statutory national rate because it accounts for the presence of personal taxes, as in Graham
(1996).
We estimate the remaining parameters (θ, σ, ρ, ρτ , δ, ψ, ξ, and f ) jointly by minimiz-
ing the distance between a list of moments and functions of moments constructed from
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model-simulated data and those computed with actual data. In this estimation procedure,
we use the optimal weight matrix, as in Bazdresch et al. (2018), clustered by firm and year.
Appendix B provides variable definitions for our actual data. In our simulated data, lever-
age, operating profits, and investment are given by p/k, (zν (kαn1−α)θ − wn − f)/k, and
(k′ − (1− δ)k)/k.
We choose the following 12 moments to match, the first six of which are the means and
standard deviations of debt, investment, and operating income, all expressed as a ratio
of assets. We also include the serial correlation of operating income, which we calculate
using the method in Han and Phillips (2010) to account for firm fixed effects. The next
four moments are regression coefficients motivated by the benchmarks in Bazdresch et al.
(2018), which are estimates of the relations between optimal policies and the model state
variables. In our model the state variables are capital, net debt, and the two shocks, z and
τ . As suggested in Bazdresch et al. (2018), we transform these variables into measurable
counterparts, in particular, the ratio of net debt to assets and after-tax operating income to
assets. Our next four moments are then the coefficients from regressing the ratio of net debt
issuance to assets and investment on these two variables. Our final moment is a difference-
in-difference coefficient from regressing leverage on the enactment dates with firm and
industry-year fixed effects. We choose the enactment dates because there is no difference
between enactment and effective dates in our model.
While all of the model parameters affect all of our moments, some of these moments
are particularly useful for parameter identification. First, the mean and standard devia-
tion of investment help identify the capital depreciation rate, δ, and the adjustment cost
parameter, ψ, respectively. In this class of models, steady state investment rises with the
depreciation rate, and the variance of investment naturally declines as quadratic adjust-
ment costs induce more smoothing. The serial correlation, ρ, of the process for z is directly
related to the estimated serial correlation of operating income, and all model variances in-
crease with the standard deviation, σ, of the driving process. Mean operating income is
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mechanically decreasing in the profit function curvature, θ, and in the fixed cost of produc-
tion, f . Nonetheless, we can separately identify these two parameters because the variance
of operating profits is also mechanically decreasing in θ, while the fixed cost of production
has little effect on this variance. In addition, leverage is decreasing in the fixed cost, as are
all of the policy-function sensitivities, as the presence of the fixed cost breaks the scaling
properties of the model and decreases the correlations among all of the model variables.
Next, the average leverage ratio contains information about the default recovery rate, ξ,.
Finally, we identify the serial correlation of the tax process from our difference-in-
difference coefficient. In our model, in contrast to our regressions, we normalize a tax
change to be positive, so the sensitivity is negative. This coefficient drops with the serial
correlation of the tax shock process, ρτ . When this parameter is low, the sensitivity is zero,
as tax changes are not expected to last.
Table 6, panel A reports the model parameter estimates. All parameter estimates are
significantly different from zero. The estimates of the profit function curvature, the capital
adjustment costs, and the standard deviation and serial correlation of the driving process
are within ranges typically reported for this class of models (Bazdresch et al. 2018). The
annual capital depreciation rate, δ, is estimated precisely at a level of 0.094. The estimate
of the deadweight loss in default is 0.646. Although seemingly high, this estimate is in line
with the average recovery rate found in Kermani and Ma (2020).This value also makes
sense for the mostly small firms in our sample, which tend to be more distressed when
they default. Finally, the fixed operating cost, f , is 0.017, which amounts to roughly 14% of
steady-state operating profits.
Table 6, panel B reports the model and data moments used for estimation. In statistical
terms, four out of the twelve moment pairs are insignificantly different from one another.
In economic terms, our model matches most of these moments well. For example, the sim-
ulated means of leverage, investment, and operating profits are all close to their real-data
counterparts.
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Although most t-statistics for these moment pairs indicate significance, this result is to
be expected with a sample of our size, as most of the statistics we use as target moments
can themselves be estimated extremely precisely. The only simulated moments that are
economically different from their data counterparts are two of the empirical policy function
coefficients. However, these coefficients do have the right sign and are expected to be larger
in absolute value in simulated data because there is much more noise in real data.
Given this model parameterization, we now explore the aspects of the model that pro-
duce a negative sensitivity of leverage to taxes. One particularly interesting feature of the
solution is the behavior of optimal debt, which we depict in Figure 3. This figure is drawn
given the parameter estimates in Table 6, and it represents two two-dimensional slices of a
four-dimensional policy function. On the x-axis of each panel are various levels of the pro-
ductivity shock, z, and on the y axis is p′/k′. Each line is drawn for one of the three levels
of taxes in our model.
In panel A, we have set k and p equal to their steady-state values. We observe hump
shapes in some of these policy functions, which reflect income and substitution effects. As
productivity increases, firms find it optimal to transfer resources through time via capital
rather than via a storage technology, which in our model is −p. Put differently, when pro-
ductivity rises, optimal investment outlays outpace internal resources, and the firm opts
for debt finance. If productivity is sufficiently high, then an income effect becomes stronger,
implying that the firm wants more of both capital and the storage technology, so debt falls
with productivity. Interestingly, in this figure, we also see that leverage is lower when the
tax rate is higher. The intuition can be understood as follows. While there is an interest tax
deduction in the model, and while, ceteris paribus, this feature of the model makes debt
more attractive when taxes are higher, taxes also make the firm less profitable and more
likely to default, so it is optimal for the firm to choose lower levels of leverage. For our es-
timated set of parameters, and for a medium-sized firm in our simulated sample, the latter
effect dominates the former.
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In panel B, we set k equal to the largest value in our simulated sample. Here, we find
that optimal leverage rises with the tax rate.
The intuition behind the difference between these two panels can be found in Figure
4, which depicts the endogenous risky interest rate on debt, r̃(k′, p′, z, τ), as a function of
leverage. As in Panel A of figure 3, this figure is drawn for the steady state capital stock.
It is also drawn for the mean of the z shock. Each of these price schedules is drawn for
a different level of the tax rate. The effect of leverage on the contract is intuitive. For any
(k′, z, τ), the risky interest rate is increasing in leverage, reflecting rising default risk.
The effect of taxes depends on the level of leverage. When leverage ranges between
0 and approximate 0.22, debt is safe, and the price of debt rises monotonically in the tax
rate, reflecting the interest tax deduction. However, for higher levels of leverage, this rela-
tion between taxes and the price of debt changes in two ways. First, the interest rate rises
monotonically in the tax rate, as a higher tax rate changes the default threshold. Second,
the spread between the prices corresponding to high and low taxes widens, reflecting the
stronger effect of taxes on the default threshold than the value of the tax deduction. The
difference between the highest and lowest tax rates in our model is approximately 5%, re-
sulting in tax savings of 0.1%. In contrast, at a debt-to-assets ratio of 0.24, Figure 4 shows
that this tax raise raises the interest rate on debt by 1%.
In our model small and medium firms are productive, have strong investment oppor-
tunities, and need to use debt to expand, so they optimally position themselves near the
point at which the interest rate schedules cross. In contrast, large firms are less productive,
do not need as much debt and optimally position themselves on the flat part of the interest
rate schedule, where debt is effectively risk-free, and the tax advantage of debt is all that
matters.
This result in the model is consistent with our own empirical evidence that the negative
relation between debt and taxes is negative for small firms. It is also consistent with the




Using comprehensive samples of both private and public companies and relying on
simple event study techniques in the spirit of Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), we study the
evolution of corporate borrowing around changes in state corporate income taxes since the
1980s. In stark contrast with the prior literature, we show that for private firms, corpo-
rate taxes on average depress business borrowing, and companies adjust capital structure
immediately upon the enactment of changes in state corporate tax policy. We show in a
structural model that these dynamics are driven by tax hikes reducing lender recovery in
default and thus widening credit spreads. Both effects cause firms to decrease leverage.
Relying on detailed financial statement data for small and mid-sized private firms as
well as large public companies from 2011 through 2017, we show that the large increases in
corporate borrowing among small private firms are associated with significant real effects.
Specifically, net capital expenditures of small private firms increase with corporate income
tax cuts. While large private and public companies also increase borrowing in response to
tax cuts, they do not experience changes in investment.
18The qualitative shape of Figures 3 and 4 does not change when we allow the firm to issue costly equity and
calibrate the issuance cost so that the frequency of issuance reflects large public U.S. firms.
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Figure 1: Empirical Distributions of Changes in Corporate Leverage. This figure presents
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Figure 3: Optimal Debt and Taxes. This figure plots optimal next-period net debt/capital
as a function of the profitability shock. Each line represents a different level of the tax rate:
low, medium, and high. Panel A is drawn for a medium-sized firm, and Panel B is drawn
for a large firm.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics. This table presents summary statistics for the firm-year de-
tailing borrowing information (Panel A), the firm-year balance sheet sample (Panel B), and
the tax changes (Panel C) used in our analyses. Commitment amount refers to the sum of
credit line and term loan commitments, while utilized amount is the sum of term loans and
the outstanding drawn amounts under credit lines. All firm financials variables in Panel B
with the exception of Book Assets are scaled by firm total assets as of the prior year.
Mean St. Dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Panel A: Firm-Year Financials Panel
Book Assets, $m 2,482 23,654 117 150 258 627 2,092
Net Income 0.06 0.11 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.16
Net Sales 1.86 1.50 0.37 0.58 1.50 2.57 3.75
EBITDA 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.25
Operating Income 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.19
Cash 0.09 0.12 0.003 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.25
LT Debt 0.28 0.27 0 0.05 0.21 0.43 0.66
Debt 0.36 0.29 0.01 0.12 0.32 0.54 0.76
Total Liab. 0.69 0.31 0.30 0.48 0.68 0.86 1.05
Interest Expense 1.71 1.89 0.03 0.37 1.14 2.39 4.26
Fixed Assets 0.32 0.28 0.03 0.08 0.25 0.48 0.76
Total Assets 1.09 0.21 0.92 0.99 1.05 1.14 1.28
Panel B: Firm-Year Borrowing Panel
Commitment Amt, $m 380 815 37 65 143 350 865
Utilized Amt, $m 154 411 0 16 52 136 342
Utilization Ratio, $m 0.52 0.36 0 0.15 0.57 0.85 1
Contract Maturity, months 66 28 36.5 49 61 78 99
Remaining Maturity, months 36 21 10 19 34 50 61
Panel C: Characteristics of Tax Changes
Tax Cuts (N=121)
Rate Change, % 0.59 0.58 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.04
Initial Rate, % 7.59 2.23 5.00 6.40 7.80 9.20 10.00
Resulting Rate, % 7.00 2.23 4.36 5.50 7.10 8.50 9.50
Tax Hikes (N=36)
Rate Change, % 1.31 1.07 0.40 0.54 1.00 1.50 2.75
Initial Rate, % 6.59 1.84 4.00 5.00 7.00 7.88 9.00





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: State Corporate Income Tax Cuts and Leverage: Public Firms. This table presents
results from firm-level annual OLS regressions of the evolution of leverage around state
corporate income tax cuts. The sample runs from 2011 through 2017 and is restricted to
public companies from the CRSP-Compustat database. All specifications include borrower
and 4-digit SIC industry-year fixed effects, lagged levels and changes in: log firm assets,
ROA, the market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, state tax hike indicators, state individual
income tax cuts and hike indicators, a set of tax base and tax credit controls, as well as
lagged changes and levels of the state GDP growth and unemployment rates. Columns
(1)-(4) present results from event studies around the effective dates of state income tax
cuts, while columns (5) through (8) present results from event studies around tax cut en-
actments. The standard errors are double clustered at the state and industry-year level.
Sample: Tax Effective Dates Tax Enactments
Dependent variable: LT Debt LT Debt (mkt) Tot Debt LT Debt LT Debt (mkt) Tot Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Event Year= −2 0.018** 0.012* 0.014* -0.007 -0.004 -0.013
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
Event Year= −1 0.014 0.014 0.012 -0.007 -0.004 -0.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012)
Event Year= 0 0.008 0.016 0.008 0.011 0.010 -0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
Event Year= +1 0.016* 0.012 0.019* 0.017 0.012 0.012
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013)
Event Year= +2 -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.017 0.013 0.007
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014)
Event Year= +3 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.019* 0.013* 0.014
(0.014) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013)
Event Year≥ +4 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
R2 0.672 0.767 0.69 0.672 0.767 0.689
N 14157 14157 14157 14157 14157 14157
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TB Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Economy Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Real Effects of State Corporate Income Tax Cuts. This table presents results
from firm-level annual OLS regressions of the evolution of firm investment and profitabil-
ity around the enactment of state corporate income tax cuts. The sample runs from 2011
through 2017 and is restricted to private companies with at least $100 million in total as-
sets as of the previous year that are rated “B” and above by the lender. All specifications
include borrower, 4-digit NAICS industry-year fixed effects, the log of lagged firm sales,
credit quality indicators, state tax hike indicators, state individual income tax cuts and hike
indicators, a set of tax base and tax credit controls, as well as lagged changes and levels of
county GDP, employment, per-capita income and population. Columns (1) and (4) present
results for the full sample, columns (2) and (5) present results for firms below the median
in total assets, and columns (3) and (6) present results for firms above the median in total
assets. The standard errors are double clustered at the state and industry-year level.
Dependent variable: Net Capital Expenditures EBITDA
Sample: All Small Large All Small Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Event Year= −2 -0.002 0.002 -0.007 0.000 0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Event Year= −1 -0.001 0.001 -0.007 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Event Year= 0 0.011* 0.014 0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.005
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Event Year= +1 0.008 -0.000 0.009 -0.000 -0.005 0.007
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Event Year= +2 0.011 0.014 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Event Year= +3 0.010 0.013 -0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Event Year≥ +4 -0.002 -0.013 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.007
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
R2 0.413 0.437 0.453 0.784 0.824 0.777
N 33871 16061 16153 35269 16886 16645
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TB Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Economy Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: Model Estimation. This table reports the parameters and moments from the es-
timation of our model from Section 5. The parameter θ is the curvature of the production
function; ρ is the serial correlation of the shock process; σ is the standard deviation of the
shock process; ρτ is the serial correlation of the tax process; δ is the capital depreciation
rate; ψ is the quadratic capital adjustment cost; ξ is the recovery rate in default; and f is
the fixed operating cost. ‘debt-to-assets’ is defined as long-term debt net of cash divided
by lagged total assets; ‘investment-to-assets’ is defined as net capital expenditures divided
by fixed assets; ‘income-to-assets’ is defined as operating income divided by lagged total
assets; ‘debt issuance’ is defined as the change in net debt divided by total assets. Tax co-
efficient is a difference-in-difference coefficient from regressing leverage on the enactment
dates with firm and industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and
year.
A. Parameter estimates
θ ρ σ ρτ δ ψ ξ f
0.9443 0.5232 0.1975 0.8575 0.0942 0.5269 0.6457 0.0273
(0.0077) (0.0088) (0.0152) (0.0104) (0.0037) (0.0322) (0.0525) (0.0085)
B. Targeted moments
Actual Simulated t-stat.
Mean debt-to-assets 0.2364 0.2346 1.3915
Standard deviation debt-to-assets 0.0970 0.1087 -2.1455
Mean investment-to-assets 0.1076 0.0972 5.7808
Standard deviation investment-to-assets 0.1404 0.0776 11.3853
Mean operating income-to-assets 0.1452 0.1881 -8.1124
Standard deviation income-to-assets 0.0493 0.0459 1.7624
Serial correlation income-to-assets 0.4102 0.4816 -0.4007
Coefficient of debt issuance on net debt -0.8588 -0.1990 -7.3038
Coefficient of debt issuance on income 0.0693 1.3432 -9.3461
Coefficient of debt issuance on net debt -0.0106 -0.2004 7.9429
Coefficient of debt issuance on income 0.0953 0.8663 -22.7310
Tax coefficient -0.0154 -0.0155 0.0102
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Below we present variable definitions for the financial statement data coming from the
FR-Y-14Q Collection. The item numbers of data fields refer to Schedule H1 of the Y-14Q
data on the Federal Reserve’s website:
https : //www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR Y − 14Q20191231 i.pdf :
Book Assets – is defined as the book value of total assets as of the end of the previous
year ‘Total Assets Prior Year’ (item #71).
Net Income is defined as the net income of firm i for the trailing twelve month period
ending in year t, ‘Net Income Current Year’ (item #59) divided by total assets of firm i in
year t− 1, ‘Total Assets Prior Year’ (item #71).
Net Sales is defined as the net sales of firm i for the trailing twelve month period
ending in year t, ‘Net Sales Current Year’ (item #54) divided by total assets of firm i in year
t− 1, ‘Total Assets Prior Year’ (item #71).
EBITDA – is defiend as the Earnings Before Iterest, Taxes, Depreciation & Amortiza-
tion of firm i for the trailing twelve month period ending in year t, divided by total assets
of firm i in year t− 1, ‘Total Assets Prior Year’ (item #71).
Operating Income is defined as operating income of firm i for the trailing twelve
month period ending in year t, ‘Operating Income’ (item #56) divided by total assets of
firm i in year t− 1, ‘Total Assets Prior Year’ (item #71).
Cash is defined as the value of cash, depository accounts and marketable securities of
firm i as of the end of year t, divided by total assets of firm i in year t − 1, ‘Total Assets
Prior Year’ (item #71).
Debt is defined as the book value of total debt of firm i as of the end of year t, ‘Short-
Term Debt’ (item #74) + ‘Long-Term Debt’ (item #78) + ‘Current Maturities of Long Term
Debt’ (item #75), divided by total assets of firm i in year t−1, ‘Total Assets Prior Year’ (item
#71).
Long − TermDebt is defined as the book value of long-term debt of firm i as of the
end of year t, ‘Long-Term Debt’ (item #78) + ‘Current Maturities of Long Term Debt’ (item
#75), divided by total assets of firm i in year t− 1, ‘Total Assets Prior Year’ (item #71).
Total Liabilities is defined as the book value of total liabilities of firm i as of the end
of year t, ‘Total Liabilities’ (item #80), divided by total assets of firm i in year t − 1, ‘Total
Assets Prior Year’ (item #71).
Interest Expense is defined as the interest expense of firm i for the trailing twelve
month period ending in year t, ‘Interest Expense’ (item #58), divided by total assets of firm
i in year t− 1, ‘Total Assets Prior Year’ (item #71).
Fixed Assets is defined as the book value of fixed assets of firm i as of the end of year
t, ‘Fixed Assets’ (item #69), divided by total assets of firm i in year t− 1, ‘Total Assets Prior
Year’ (item #71).
Total Assets is defined as the book value of total assets of firm i as of the end of year
t, ‘Total Assets Current Year’ (item #70), divided by total assets of firm i in year t− 1, ‘Total
Assets Prior Year’ (item #71).
Net Capital Expenditures is defined as the difference between capital expendi-
tures and capital divestitures of firm i as of the end of year t, ‘Capital Expenditures’ (item
43
#82), divided by total assets of firm i in year t− 1, ‘Total Assets Prior Year’ (item #71).
Below we present definitions for the variables relying on loan data from the Shared Na-
tional Credit Database:
Commitment Amt is defined as the total value of syndicated loan commitments of
firm i as of the end of year t, where total commitments include both the size of credit line
commitments and outstanding term loans.
Utilized Amt is defined as the value of utilized amounts under total syndicated loan
commitments of firm i as of the end of year t, where utilized commitments include both
drawn amounts under credit line commitments and outstanding term loans.
Utilization Ratio is defined as the fraction of total syndicated commitments that has
been drawn (utilized) by firm i as of the end of year t.
Contract Maturity is defined as the weighted average original contract maturity
across all syndicated loan commitments of borrower i in year t.
Remaining Maturity is defined as the weighted average remaining contract matu-
rity across all syndicated loan commitments of borrower i in year t.
Below we present definitions for the variables relying on financial statement data from
the Compustat database:
Tot Debt is defined as the sum of long-term debt (item dltt) and short-term debt (item
dlc) of firm i in year t, divided by the book value of total assets of firm i in year t− 1 (item
at).
LT Debt is defined as the value of long-term debt (item dltt) of firm i in year t, divided
by the book value of total assets of firm i in year t− 1 (item at).
Tot Debt (mkt) is defined as the sum of long-term debt (item dltt) and short-term
debt (item dlc) of firm i in year t, divided by the market value of total assets of firm i in
year t − 1. The market value of total assets is defined as the sum of long-term debt (item
dltt), short-term debt (item dlc), and the market value of equity (the product of items prcc f
and csho).
LT Debt (mkt) is defined as the value of long-term debt (item dltt) of firm i in year t,
divided by the market value of total assets of firm i in year t− 1. The market value of total
assets is defined as the sum of long-term debt (item dltt), short-term debt (item dlc), and
the market value of equity (the product of items prcc f and csho).
44



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B2: Summary Statistics. This table presents summary statistics for the 754 firm-years
in our sample issuing private placements through Regulation D offerings since 2009. All
firm financials variables the exception of Book Assets are scaled by firm total assets as of
the prior year.
Mean St. Dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Firm-Year Financials for Firms with Private Placements
Book Assets, $m 1,116 4,000 122 164 280 634 2,048
Net Income 0.02 0.10 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.11
Net Sales 1.39 1.38 0.14 0.40 0.97 1.82 3.39
EBITDA 0.12 0.13 0.003 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.22
Operating Income 0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.004 0.04 0.09 0.17
Cash 0.08 0.12 0.002 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.22
LT Debt 0.38 0.30 0.01 0.14 0.32 0.56 0.83
Debt 0.43 0.30 0.05 0.21 0.38 0.61 0.86
Total Liab. 0.75 0.33 0.37 0.53 0.71 0.93 1.17
Interest Expense 2.27 2.05 0.11 0.76 1.68 3.26 5.03
Fixed Assets 0.38 0.36 0.03 0.08 0.25 0.61 1.01



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B4: State Corporate Income Tax Cuts, Firm Leverage, and Investment: Credit Qual-
ity Split. This table presents results from firm-level annual OLS regressions of the evolution
of firm leverage around the enactment of state corporate income tax cuts. The sample runs
from 2011 through 2017 and is restricted to small private companies with at least $100 mil-
lion in total assets as of the previous year that are rated “B” and above by the lender. All
specifications include borrower, 4-digit NAICS industry-year fixed effects, the log of lagged
firm sales, credit quality indicators, state tax hike indicators, state individual income tax
cuts and hike indicators, a set of tax base and tax credit controls, as well as lagged changes
and levels of county GDP, employment, per-capita income and population. Columns (1),
(3), and (5) present results for non-investment grade firms, while columns (2), (4), and (6)
present results for investment-grade firms. The standard errors are double clustered at the
state and industry-year level.
Dependent variable: Long-Term Debt Total Debt Net Capex
Sample: Non-IG IG Non-IG IG Non-IG IG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Event Year= −2 -0.000 0.010 -0.005 0.010 0.005 0.008
(0.014) (0.012) (0.028) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013)
Event Year= −1 0.005 0.017 0.011 0.014 0.001 0.011
(0.017) (0.016) (0.028) (0.018) (0.009) (0.012)
Event Year= 0 0.039* 0.020 0.051** 0.026 0.033** 0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.013) (0.016)
Event Year= +1 0.027 0.013 0.049* 0.029 0.008 0.005
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.013) (0.020)
Event Year= +2 0.038* 0.014 0.068*** 0.022 0.008 0.008
(0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.015) (0.018)
Event Year= +3 0.028* -0.009 0.039 0.002 0.023 -0.010
(0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014)
Event Year≥ +4 0.022 -0.011 0.017 -0.006 -0.009 -0.025***
(0.022) (0.011) (0.026) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009)
R2 0.772 0.843 0.736 0.905 0.438 0.596
N 9964 5428 9964 5428 9144 5115
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TB Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Economy Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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